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Abstract. We study two quantitative models of information leakage in the
pi-calculus. The ﬁrst model presupposes an attacker with an essentially unlimited
computational power. The resulting notion of absolute leakage, measured in bits,
is in agreement with secrecy as deﬁned by Abadi and Gordon: a process has an
absolute leakage of zero precisely when it satisﬁes secrecy. The second model
assumes a restricted observation scenario, inspired by the testing equivalence
framework, where the attacker can only conduct repeated success-or-failure
experiments on processes. Moreover, each experiment has a cost in terms of
communication actions. The resulting notion of leakage rate, measured in bits
per action, is in agreement with the ﬁrst model: the maximum information that
can be extracted by repeated experiments coincides with the absolute leakage A
of the process. Moreover, the overall extraction cost is at least A/R,w h e r eR is
the rate of the process. Strategies to effectively estimate both absolute leakage
and rate are also discussed.
Keywords: process calculi, secrecy, information leakage, information
theory.
1 Introduction
Research in language-based security has traditionally focused on qualitative aspects.
Recently, a few models have been proposed that allow forms of quantitative reasoning
on security properties. For a sequential program, it is natural to quantify leakage by
measuring the information ﬂow between secret ("high") and public ("low") variables
induced by the computed function. Along these lines, an elegant theory of quantitative
non-interferencehas been recently proposed by Clark et al. [12] (other proposals in the
literature are examined in the concluding section.)
In this paper, we study quantitativemodels of informationleakage in process calculi.
Processes come with no natural notion of computed function. Rather, one is interested
in quantifying the leakage induced by their observable behaviour. The difference in
intent can be illustrated by the following concrete example. A smart-card implements a
function that takes documentsas input and releases documentssigned with a secret key
as output. However,typical attacks targeting the secret key do not focus on the function
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itself, but rather on the behaviour of the card, in terms e.g. of observed time variance of
basic operations [9], or observed power consumption [10].
Our starting point is the notion of secrecy as formalized by Abadi and Gordon, orig-
inally in the setting of the spi-calculus [1]. In the sequel, we will refer to this notion
as AG-secrecy. Informally, AG-secrecy holds for a process P and a parameter x repre-
senting a sensible information, if the the observable behaviour of P does not depend on
the actual values x takes on. In other words, an attacker cannot infer anything about x
by interacting with P. The notion of "observable behaviour" is formalized in terms of
behavioural equivalence, such as may testing [4,2].
Althoughelegantandintuitive, AG-secrecyisinpracticetoorigid.Thebehaviourofa
typical security application dependsnontrivially on the sensible information it protects.
Nevertheless, many such applications are considered secure, on the ground that the
amount of leaked information is, on the average, negligible. Consider a PIN-checking
processP(x) that receivesa code froma user and checksit against a 5-digitssecret code
x, in order to authorize or deny a certain operation. Clearly, an attacker may acquire
negative information about x by interacting with P(x).H o w e v e r ,i fP(x) is intended
to model, say, an off-line device like a card reader, such small leaks should be of no
concern. More generally, one would like to ﬁrst measure the information leakage of a
given system and then decide if it is acceptable or not.
In the present paper, we propose two quantitative models of leakage for processes:
one for measuring absolute leakage, and one for measuring the rate at which informa-
tion is leaked. As explained below, the two models correspond to differentassumptions
on the control an attacker may exercise over processes. The connections between these
two models will also be clariﬁed.
After quickly reviewing a few notions from information theory that will be used
in the paper (Section 2), we introduce our reference language, a pi-calculus with data
values (Section 3). In the ﬁrst model (absolute leakage, Section 4), we presuppose an
attackerwithfullcontrolovertheprocess.Usingthe languageofunconditionalsecurity,
the model can be phrased as follows. A sensible information is modeled as a random
variable, say X.T h eap r i o r iuncertainty of an adversary about X is measured by the
Shannon entropy H(X), expressed in bits. For full generality, it is assumed that some
"side-information" Y, possibly related to X, is publicly available: the conditional en-
tropy H(X|Y) measures the uncertainty about X given thatY is known. The process P,
depending in general on both X andY, induces a random variable Z = P(X,Y): follow-
ing the discussion above, it is reasonable to stipulate that Z takes as values "observable
behaviours", that is, equivalence classes of a ﬁxed behavioral semantics. Now, the con-
ditional entropy H(X|Y,Z) quantiﬁes the uncertainty on X left after observing both Y
and Z. Hencethe differenceI =H(X|Y)−H(X|Y,Z) is the amountof uncertaintyabout
X removed by P, that we take as its absolute leakage. We prove that this notion is in
full agreement with the qualitative notion of AG-secrecy. In the special case when there
is no side-information, this means that P(x) respects AG-secrecy if and only if P(X)
has an absolute leakage of 0 for every random variable X. We also offer two alternative
characterizations of zero-leakage, hopefully more amenable to automatic checking.
The second model we consider (rate of leakage, Section 5), reﬁnes the previous sce-
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we stipulate that an attacker can only conduct upon P repeated experiments E1, E2,...
each yielding a binaryanswer, success or failure.The attacker has "full control" – in the
sense of the ﬁrst model – over the compound systems P||E, but not over P itself. The
security measure we are interested in is the overall number of communicationsrequired
to extract one bit of information in this scenario. Thus, we deﬁne the rate at which P
leaks information in terms of the maximal number of bits of information per visible
action conveyed by an experiment on P. We then give evidence that this is indeed a
reasonable notion. First, we establish a relationship with the ﬁrst model, showing that
absolute leakage A coincides with the maximum information that can be extracted by
repeated experiments, and that this costs at least A/R,w h e r eR is the rate of P. Second,
we establish that, under certain conditions, process iteration (∗P) leaves the rate of P
unchanged, which is what one would expect from a good deﬁnition of rate. Finally, in
the vein of testing equivalence, we give an experiment-independentcharacterization of
rate in terms of execution traces.
Strategies to effectively estimate rate of leakage (Section 5) and absolute leakage
(Section6)arealsodiscussed.Thesestrategiesdependontheuse ofsymbolicsemantics
in the vein of [7,3]. Some remarks on further and related work conclude the paper
(Section 7). Proofs have been omitted due to lack of space.
2 Preliminary Notions
We quickly recall a few concepts from elementary information theory; see e.g. [15] for
fulldeﬁnitionsandunderlyingmotivations.We shallconsiderdiscreterandomvariables
(r.v.) X,Y,... deﬁned over a common probabilty space Ω. We say that a r.v. X is of type
U, and write X : U,i fX(Ω) ⊆ U. We shall always assume U to be ﬁnite. Elements
u ∈ U are called samples of X,a n d|X| is |{u ∈ U|Pr[X = u] > 0}|. The concepts of
independent and uniformly distributed (u.d.) random variables, and of expectation of
X (E[X],f o rX real-valued) are deﬁned as usual. As a function, every random variable
induces a partition into events of its domain Ω, {X−1(u)|u ∈ X(Ω)}: we say that two
random variables X and Y are equivalent if they induce on Ω the same partition. A
vector of random variables ˜ X =( X1,...,Xn), with n ≥ 0a n dXi : Ui, is just a random
variable of typeU1×···×Un.
Given X :U,t h eentropy X of and conditional entropy of X given Y :V are deﬁned
by:
H(X)
def = −∑u∈U Pr[X = u]·log(Pr[X = u])
H(X|Y)
def = ∑v∈V H(X|Y = v)·Pr[Y = v]
where H(X|Y =v)=−∑u∈U Pr[X =u|Y =v]·log(Pr[X =u|Y =v]), all logarithmsare
taken to the base of 2 and by convention 0·log0 = 0. Two equivalent random variables
have the same entropy and conditional entropy. The following (in)equalities hold:
0 ≤ H(X) ≤ log|X| (1)
H(X,Y)=H(X|Y)+H(Y) (chain rule) (2)
H(X1,...,Xn) ≤ H(X1)+···+H(Xn) (3)
where:in(1),equalityontheleft holdsiffX is aconstant,andequalityontherightholds
iff X is u.d.; in (3), equality holds iff the Xi’s are pairwise independent. Note that by (2)122 M. Boreale
and (3), H(X|Y)=H(X) iff X andY are independent.IfY =F(X) for some function F
then H(Y|X)=0. Informationon X conveyedbyY (aka, mutual information)i sd e ﬁ n e d
as:
I(X;Y)
def = H(X)−H(X|Y).
By the chain rule, I(X;Y)=I(Y;X),a n dI(X;Y)=0i f fX and Y are independent.
Mutual information can be generalized by conditioning on another r.v. Z: I(X;Y|Z)
def =
H(X|Z)−H(X|Z,Y). Conditioning on Z may in general either increase or decrease
mutual information between X and Y. Note that entropy of a r.v. only depends on the
underlyingprobability distribution; thus any probability vector ˜ p =(p1,...,pn) (pi ≥0,
∑i pi = 1) determines a unique entropy value denoted H( ˜ p); we shall often abbreviate
H(p,1− p) as H(p).
3 The Model
We assume a countable set of variables V = {x,y,...}, a family of non-empty, ﬁnite
value-sets U
def = {U,V,...}, and a countable set of names N = {a,b,...}, partitioned
into a family of sorts S,S ,.... We assume a function that maps each x to some T ∈
U∪{S,S ,...}, written x : T, and say that x has type T. The inverse image of each T is
inﬁnite. These notations are extended to tuples as expected, e.g. for ˜ x =( x1,...,xn) and
˜ T =( T1,...,Tn),˜ x : ˜ T means x1 : T1,...,xn : Tn.W el e tu,v be generic elements of a ﬁnite
value-set. By slight abuse of notation, we sometimes denote by ˜ U the cartesian product
U1×···×Un.
An evaluation σ is a map from V to
￿
U∈UU ∪N that respects typing, that is, for
each x ∈ dom(σ), x : T implies σ(x) ∈ T. We denote by [ ˜ d/˜ x] the evaluation mapping
˜ x to ˜ d component-wise. By tσ,w h e r et is a term over an arbitrary signature with free
variables fv(t) ⊆ V, we denote the result of replacing each free variable x ∈ dom(σ)∩
fv(t) with σ(x).
We assume a language of logical formulae φ,ψ,.... We leave the language unspeci-
ﬁed, but assume it includes a ﬁrst order calculus with variables V, that function sym-
bols include all values in U and names as constants, and that the set of predicates
includes equality [x = y]. We write U,N |= φ,o rs i m p l y|= φ, if for all evaluations
σ s.t. dom(σ) ⊇fv(φ), φσ is valid (i.e. a tautology).We will often write φ(˜ x) to indicate
that the free variables of φ are included in ˜ x, and in this case, abbreviate φ[˜ u/˜ x] as φ(˜ u).
The process language is a standard pi-calculus with variables and data values. We
assume a countable set of identiﬁers A,B,... and use e,e ... to range over an unspeciﬁed
set of expressions, that can be formed starting from variables, values and names. The
syntax of processes P,Q,... is given below.
m ::= x

 a
P,Q ::= 0
  τ.P
  m(˜ x).P
  m˜ e.P
  φP
  P+P
  (νb)P
  P|P
  A(˜ e) .
Each identiﬁer A has an associated deﬁning equationof the form A(˜ x)
def = P. Inputpreﬁx
m(˜ x). and restriction (νb) are binders for ˜ x and b, respectively, thus, notions of freeQuantifying Information Leakage in Process Calculi 123
variables (fv) and free names (fn) arise as expected. We identify processes up to alpha-
equivalence. We assume a few constraints on the syntax above: ˜ x is a tuple of distinct
elements in input preﬁx and in A(˜ x)
def = P, and in the latter fv(P) ⊆ ˜ x; φ is quantiﬁer-
free. We assume a ﬁxed sorting system àl aMilner. In particular, each sort S has an
associated sort object ob(S)=( T1,...,Tk) (k ≥ 0). Here, each Ti is either a sort or a
value-set from the universe U. Informally, a process obeys this sorting system if in
every input and output preﬁx, a name/variable m of sort S carries a tuple of objects
of the sort speciﬁed by ob(S); we omit the details that are standard. We let Πo the set
of processes (possibly containing free variables) obeying these conditions and Πc the
subset of closed processes. Notationally, we shall often omit trailing 0’s, writing e.g.
a.b. instead of a.b.0, we shall write ∑
n
i=1Pi for nondeterministic choice P1+···+Pn,
and let replication !P denote the process deﬁned by the equation: !P
def = P|!P.
We assume over Πc the standard early operational semantics of pi-calculus – see
e.g. [14]. Let us just remind that in this form of semantics transitions are the form
P
µ
− → P ,w h e r eµ is one of τ (invisible action), a ˜ d (input action) or (ν˜ c)a ˜ d with ˜ c ⊆ ˜ d
(output action) and d ::= a | u (name or value). A few standard notations will also
be used. In particular, for each visible (different from τ) action α, P
α =⇒ P  means
P(
τ − →)∗ α −→ (
τ − →)∗P . This notation is extended to any sequence of visible actions s
(i.e. a trace), P
s =⇒ P , as expected. Finally, P
s =⇒ means that there is P  s.t. P
s =⇒ P .
We let ∼ be a ﬁxed equivalence relation over Πc. We denote by [Q] the equivalence
class of a process Q. We assume ∼ is included in trace equivalence [2], includes strong
bisimulation [14] and preserves all operators of the calculus, except possibly input pre-
ﬁx and unguarded nondeterministic choice. We introduce now the main concept of this
section. An open process is a pair (P, ˜ x), written P(˜ x), with ˜ x a tuple of distinct vari-
ables of type ˜ U ⊆U and P∈Πo such that fv(P)⊆ ˜ x; when no confusionarises, we shall
abbreviate P[˜ u/˜ x] as P(˜ u) and (P[˜ y/˜ x])(˜ y) as P(˜ y) (˜ y a tuple of distinct variables.)
Deﬁnition 1 (open processes as random variables). Let P(˜ x) be an open process and
˜ X a vector of random variables, with ˜ x : ˜ U and ˜ X : ˜ U, for one and the same ˜ U. We
denote by P( ˜ X) the random variable F ◦ ˜ X,whereF = λ˜ u ∈ ˜ U.[P[˜ u/˜ x]].
Note that a sample of P( ˜ X) is an equivalence class of ∼.
Example 1. A PIN-checking process can be deﬁned as follows. Here, x,z :1 ..kf o rs o m e
integer k and x represents the secret code. The situation is modeled where an observer
can freely interact with the checking process.
Check(x)
def = a(z).([z = x]ok.Check(x)+[ z  = x]no.Check(x)). (4)
The range of the function F : u  → [Check(u)] has k distinct elements, as u  = u  implies
Check(u)  ∼ Check(u ). As a consequence, if X :1 ..k is a random variable, the distri-
bution of P(X) mirrors exactly that of X. E.g., if X is uniformly distributed, then so is
P(X), i.e. the probability of each sample is 1/k.
Note that, if P(˜ u) ∼ Q(˜ u) for each ˜ u, then, for any ˜ X, P( ˜ X) and Q( ˜ X) are the same
random variable. Another concept we shall rely upon is that of most general boolean,124 M. Boreale
borrowed from [7,3], that is, the most general condition under which two given open
processes are equivalent.
Deﬁnition 2 (mgb). Let P(˜ x) and Q(˜ y) be two open processes, with ˜ x : ˜ U and ˜ y : ˜ V.
We denote by mgb(P(˜ x), Q(˜ y)) a chosen formula φ(˜ x, ˜ y) s.t. for each ˜ u ∈ ˜ U and ˜ v ∈ ˜ V:
P(˜ u) ∼ Q(˜ v) if and only if φ(˜ u, ˜ v) is true.
It is worthwhile to notice that in many cases mgb’s for pairs of open pi-processes can
be automatically computed relying on symbolic transition semantics. Let us recall from
[7,3] that a symbolic transition also carries a logical formula: P
µ,φ
−−→ P .I n[ 7 ] ,a n
algorithm is described to compute mgb’ sf o rp a i ro fp r o c e s s e sb o t hh a v i n gﬁnite sym-
bolic transition systems. Here, we will just assume that the logical language guarantees
existence of mgb for any given pair of open processes.
4 Absolute Leakage
Throughout the section and unless otherwise stated, we let P(˜ x, ˜ y) be an arbitrary open
process, with ˜ x : ˜ U and ˜ y : ˜ V, while ˜ X : ˜ U and ˜ Y : ˜ V are two arbitrary vectors of random
variables, and Z
def = P( ˜ X, ˜ Y).
Deﬁnition 3 (absoluteleakage).The(absolute)informationleakagefrom ˜ X toP given
˜ Yi sA(P; ˜ X | ˜ Y)
def = I( ˜ X;Z|˜ Y)=H( ˜ X|˜ Y)−H( ˜ X|˜ Y,Z).
When ˜ Y is empty, we simply write leakage as A(P; ˜ X). A ﬁrst useful fact says that
leakage is nothing but the uncertainty about Z after observing ˜ Y. The proof is a simple
application of the chain rule (2).
Lemma 1. A(P; ˜ X | ˜ Y)=H(Z|˜ Y). In particular, if ˜ yi se m p t y ,A(P; ˜ X)=H(Z).
Example 2. The process Check(x) deﬁned in (4) leaks all information about x. For
example, if X is u.d on 1..kt h e nZ= P(X) is u.d. over a set of k samples. Hence
A(Check;X)=H(Z)=logk = H(X).
Suppose now the adversary cannotinteractfreely withCheck, but ratherhe observes
the result of a user interacting with Check:
OneTry(x,y)
def =( νa)(Check(x)|ay). (5)
Clearly,foranyX,Y :1..k,therangeoftherandomvariableZ =OneTry(X,Y)hasonly
two elements, that is [τ.ok] and [τ.no], that have probabilities Pr[X =Y] and Pr[X  =Y],
respectively.InthecasewhereX andY areuniformlydistributedandindependent,these
probabilities are 1/k and 1−1/k, respectively. We are interested in A(OneTry; X |Y).
Easy calculations show that Z andY are in fact independent. For the sake of concrete-
ness, let us assume k = 10; then we can compute absolute leakage as
A(OneTry;X |Y)=H(Z|Y)=H(Z)=H(
1
10
) ≈ 0.469.
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The next result is about composing leakage. Let us say that a n-holes contextC[·,...,·]
preserves ∼ if whenever Pi ∼ P 
i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n then C[P1,...,Pn] ∼ C[P 
1,...,P 
n].T h e
following proposition states that leakage of a compound system cannot be greater than
the sum of leakage of individual systems. The (simple) proof is based on inequality
(3) plus the so called "data processing" inequality, saying that for any r.v. W and any
function F of appropriate type, H(F(W)) ≤ H(W).
Proposition 1 (compositionality). Let C[·,...,·] be a n-holes context that preserves ∼,
andletQi(˜ x, ˜ y) beopenprocesses, 1≤i≤n.LetP(˜ x, ˜ y)=C[Q1(˜ x, ˜ y),...,Qn(˜ x, ˜ y)].T h e n
A(P; ˜ X | ˜ Y) ≤
n
∑
i=1
A(Qi; ˜ X | ˜ Y). (6)
For example, in the case of parallel composition, inequality (6) specializes to
A(P|Q; ˜ X | ˜ Y) ≤ A(P; ˜ X | ˜ Y)+A(Q; ˜ X | ˜ Y). The inequality implies that leakage is
never increased by unary operators. In the case of replication !, this leads to the some-
what unexpected conclusion A(!P; ˜ X | ˜ Y) ≤ A(P; ˜ X | ˜ Y). Inequalities provided by (6)
may hold strict or not, as shown below.
Example 3. Consider P(x)=( [ x = 0]a)|a, where x : {0,1}, and X u.d. on the same
set. Then 1 =A(P;X) >A(!P;X)=0. The reason for the latter equality is that for v ∈
{0,1},!P(v)∼!a,that is, the behaviourof !P(x) doesnotdependon x, so H(P(X))=0.
On the other hand, consider P1(x)=[ x = 2]a +[ x = 4]a and P2(x)=[ x = 1]b +
[x = 2]b, where this time x :1 ..4, and X is u.d. on the same set. Then A(P1|P2; X)=
A(P1; X)+A(P2; X)=H(1
2)+H(1
2)=2.
Our next task is to investigate the situation of zero leakage. We start from Abadi and
Gordon’ deﬁnition of Secrecy, originally formulated in the setting of the spi-calculus
[1]. According to the latter, a process P(˜ x) keeps ˜ x secret if the observable behaviour
of P(˜ x) does not depend on the actual values ˜ x may take on. Partly motivated by the
non-interferencescenario [5,16], where variablesare partitionedinto "low" and "high",
we ﬁnd it natural to generalize the deﬁnition of [1] to the case where the behaviour of
P may also depend on further parameters ˜ y known to the adversary.
Deﬁnition 4 (generalized secrecy). We say that P(˜ x, ˜ y) keeps ˜ x secret given ˜ yi f ,f o r
each ˜ v ∈ ˜ V, and for each ˜ u ∈ ˜ U and ˜ u  ∈ ˜ U, it holds P(˜ u, ˜ v) ∼ P(˜ u , ˜ v).
The main result of the section states agreementof diversenotionsof secrecy:functional
(describedabove),quantitative (zero leakage) and logical (independenceof mgb’s from
˜ x). The latter appearsto be more amenableto automatic checking,at least in those cases
where the mgb can be computed. We also offer an "optimized" version of the quanti-
tative notion, by which it is sufﬁcient to check zero-leakage relatively to uniformly
distributed and independent ˜ X and ˜ Y.
Theorem 1 (secrecy). Let P(˜ x, ˜ y) be an open process. The following assertions are
equivalent:
1. P(˜ x, ˜ y) keeps ˜ x secret given ˜ y.
2. A(P; ˜ X∗| ˜ Y∗)=0,f o rs o m e ˜ X∗ : ˜ U and ˜ Y∗ : ˜ V uniformly distributed and
independent.126 M. Boreale
3. max ˜ X: ˜ U, ˜ Y:˜ V A(P; ˜ X| ˜ Y)=0.
4. φ ⇔∃˜ x˜ x .φ,w h e r eφ = mgb

P(˜ x, ˜ y), P(˜ x , ˜ y )

,f o r˜ x  and ˜ y  tuples of distinct vari-
ables disjoint from ˜ x and ˜ y, but of the same type.
Example 4. Consider the following process, where x,y :1 ..4:
Q(x,y)
def =( νc)

c|[y = 1]c.a

+[ x = 2]τ.a.
It is immediate to see that Q does not keep x secret, given y. E.g.,if the adversary knows
that y  = 1 and observes the behaviour [τ.a] then he can infer that x = 2. In fact, the
mgb given by the theorem above is φ =

[y = 1] → ([y  = 1]∨[x  = 2])

∧

[y  = 1] →
([y = 1]∨[x = 2])

, and clearly, φ  ⇔∃ xx .φ.A sa ne x a m p l e ,f o rX,Y independent and
u.d on 1..4, the leakage from X to Q givenY can be computed as H(Z|Y) ≈ 0.608.T h e
process Q (x,y)=Q(x,y)+[y  = 1]τ.a keeps x secret given y.
5 Rate of Leakage
We assume now an attacker can only conductupon P repeated experiments, each yield-
ing a binary1 answer, say success or failure. We are interested in the number of com-
munications that are necessary for the adversary to extract one bit of information about
˜ X in this way.
In the rest of the section, we ﬁx ∼ to be weak trace equivalence (aka may testing
equivalence[4,2]) written , anddeﬁnedas: P Q ifffor eachtrace s, P
s =⇒ iff Q
s =⇒.
For the sake of simplicity, we shall only consider processes where channels transport
tuples of values, i.e. we ban name-passing. For the same reason, we shall assume that
no side-information is available to the attacker, i.e. ˜ y is empty. We plan to present the
treatment of the most general case in a full version of the present paper. Throughout
the section and unless otherwise stated, P(˜ x),w h e r e˜ x : ˜ U, denotes an arbitrary open
pi-process, ˜ X an arbitrary vector of random variables of type ˜ U and Z is P( ˜ X). Recall
that A(P; ˜ X)=H(Z).
Deﬁnitions and basic properties. Consistently with the testing equivalence framework
[4,2], we view an experimentE as a processes that, when composed in parallel with P,
may succeed or not. Input on a distinct name ω, carrying no objects, is used to signal
success to the adversary. Here, it is convenient to adjust the notion of composition ( 
below) to ensure that, in case of success, exactly one success action is reported to the
adversary.
Deﬁnition 5 (experiments).An experimentE is a closed processformedwithoutusing
recursive deﬁnitions and possibly using the distinct success action ω.
We say that a nonempty trace of visible actions s is successful for Ei fω does not
occur in s and E
s·ω =⇒ .
For each E and process Q, let us deﬁne Q E
def =( ν˜ c,ω )(P|E[ω /ω]|ω .ω),w h e r e
˜ c = fn(Q,E)\{ω} and ω  / ∈ fn(P,Q,ω).
1 We expect no signiﬁcant change in the theory if k-ary answers, with k > 2 ﬁxed, were instead
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Note that for each Q it must be either Q E   0 – meaning that E fails – or Q E   ω.0
– meaning that E succeeds. Hence, for each E, we can deﬁne a binary random variable
thus2
E∗ def = P( ˜ X) E.
Information on ˜ X conveyed by E∗ is I( ˜ X ; E∗)=H(E∗)−H(E∗| ˜ X)=H(E∗).T h i s
information is at most one bit. The rate notion of rate we are after should involve a
ratio between this quantity of information and the cost of E. The following example
showsthe roleplayedbynon-determinismin extractinginformation,andprovidessome
indications as to what we should intend by cost.
Example 5. ConsideragainCheck(X),wherethistimeX isu.d.over1..k,forsomeﬁxed
even integer k ≥ 2. An experiment E that extracts one bit out of E
def = ∑
k/2
d=1 ad.ok.ω.
An attacker can only observe the outcome of the interaction between Check and E, i.e.
a sample of the r.v. E∗ =Check(X) E. If action ω is observed, then it must be X ≤ k/2;
if action ω is not observed, then it must be X > k/2. Note that I(X;E∗)=H(E∗)=
H(1
2)=1.
The above example suggests that different successful traces of an experiment should
be counted as different "trials" attempted by the attacker. The cost of each trial can be
assumed to be proportional to its length as a trace. These considerations motivate the
deﬁnition below.
Deﬁnition 6 (rate). For each experiment E, deﬁne its cost as |E|
def = ∑{|s| :
s is succesful for E}.T h erate of P relative to ˜ Xi s
R (P; ˜ X)
def = sup
|E|>0
H

E∗
|E|
. (7)
Our ﬁrst result is an experiment-independent characterization of rate. In accordance
with the may testing approach, this characterization is obtained in terms of observa-
tions of single traces. In what follows, given a trace of visible actions s, we consider
the r.v. P( ˜ X)
s =⇒, which may yield true or false, and denote by ps the probability3
Pr[(P( ˜ X)
s =⇒)=true]. Recall that for 0≤ p≤ 1, we denote by H(p) the entropy of the
distribution (p,1− p).
Proposition 2. It holds that R (P; ˜ X)=sup|s|>0
H(ps)
|s| .
Example 6. Consider the processCheckOnce(x)
def = a(z).([z = x]ok+[z  = x]no),w h e r e
x,z :1..10, and X u.d. on the same interval. It is immediate to verify that the ratio in the
proposition above is maximized by any of s = ad·ok or s = ad·no, for d ∈ 1..10.T h i s
yields R (CheckOnce; X)=H( 1
10)/2 ≈ 0.234.
2 We would write E∗(P) should any confusion about P arise.
3 It is important to note that this deﬁnition does not induce a probability distribution on the set
of traces; rather, it assigns each trace s a binary distribution (ps,1− ps).128 M. Boreale
The proposition above allows one, at least in principle, to compute the rate of any
process havinga ﬁnite symbolic transitionsystem. In fact, relyingon P’s symbolictran-
sition system, it is possible to compute, for any given trace s, a logical formula φs(˜ x)
expressing the exact condition on ˜ x under which P(˜ x) can perform s (see [7,3]). From
these formulae it is easy to compute, or at least estimate with any degree of precision,
t h er a t eo fP – we omit the details.
The next result explains the relationship between the notion of rate and absolute
leakage. In particular, (a) establishes that H(Z) is the maximal information that can
be extracted by repeated binary experiments; and (b) provides a lower bound on the
cost necessary to extract this information, in terms of the rate of P – thus providing a
justiﬁcation for the name "rate". For ˜ E =( E1,E2,...,En) a vector of experiments, write
| ˜ E| = |E1|+···+|En| for its cost, and ˜ E∗ for the vector of r.v. (E∗
1,E∗
2,...,E∗
n).
Proposition 3. It holds that
(a) A(P; ˜ X)=H(Z)=max ˜ E I( ˜ X ; ˜ E∗)
(b) for each ˜ E, I( ˜ X ; ˜ E∗) ≤|˜ E|·R (P; ˜ X) .
Note in particular, that the cost of extracting all the available information H(Z) cannot
be less than
H(Z)
R (P; ˜ X). It is important to remark that processes with the same absolute
leakage may well exhibit different rates. Here is a small example to illustrate this point.
Example 7. Let P(x) and Q(x),w h e r ex:0 ..3, be deﬁned as follows:
P(x)=[ x = 0](a+b)+[ x = 1](b+c)+[ x = 2](c+d)+[ x = 3](d+a)
Q(x)=[ x = 0]a +[ x = 1]b +[ x = 2]c +[ x = 3]d.
Assume X is u.d. over 0..3.B o t hP (X) and Q(X) are u.d. on a domain of four elements
(the four distinct equivalence classes [P(i)],r e s p .[Q(i)],f o ri∈ 0..3). Hence leakage
is H(P(X)) = H(Q(X)) = H(X)=2 bits. On the other hand, each nonempty trace of
P occurs with probability 1/2, while each nonempty trace of Q occurs with probabil-
ity 1/4. Thus, by Proposition 2, R (P;X)=H(1
2)=1 and R (Q;X)=H(1
4) ≈ 0.811.
Proposition 3(b) implies that gaining all information about X costs the attacker no less
than 2 in the case of P, and no less than 3 in the case of Q. Indeed, a sequence of two
(resp. three) one-action experiments is sufﬁcient (a.ω, b.ω for P and a.ω, b.ω, c.ω for
Q) to determine X.
Compositionality. Itispossibletogiveupperboundsfortherate ofacompoundprocess
intermsofthecomponentexpressions,intheveinofProposition1. Someoftheseupper
bounds are rather crude (e.g. in the case of restriction), others are more sophisticated
(e.g. R (ae.P; ˜ X) ≤ max{H([e( ˜ X)=v])), R (P; ˜ X)}) – we leave the details for the full
version of the paper. Here, we concentrate on the rate of iterated processes. In order
to deﬁne iteration, we have to ﬁrst deﬁne sequential composition. Output on a distinct
name stop, not carrying objects, is used to signal termination of a thread. Hence we
deﬁne sequential composition as P;Q
def =( ν stop )(P[stop /stop]|stop .Q) (with stop 
fresh). This is not sequential composition in the usual sense, but it is equivalent in the
contextwe aregoingtoconsider–see deﬁnitionbelow.ForanyP,let iteration∗PbetheQuantifying Information Leakage in Process Calculi 129
processrecursivelydeﬁnedby∗P
def = P;∗P.We showthat,undersuitableconditions,the
rate of ∗P is the same as P’s. The condition below requires essentially that termination
of a single thread in a process is equivalent to termination of the whole process.
Deﬁnition 7 (determinate processes). Let Q be a closed process. We say that a trace
si sterminating for Qi fQ
s·stop
=⇒ . We say that Q is determinate if for every terminating
traces, wheneverQ
s =⇒Q  thenQ   stop. Finally,anopenprocessP(˜ x) is determinate
if ∑˜ u∈ ˜ U P(˜ u) is determinate.
We need another technical condition: let us say that Q is stable if whenever Q
ε =⇒ Q 
(ε = empty trace) then Q    Q.
Theorem 2 (iteration rate). Suppose that P(˜ x) is determinate, and that for each ˜ u,
P(˜ u) is stable. Then R (∗P; ˜ X)=R (P; ˜ X).
Example 8. It is easy to check that CheckOnceStop(x)
def = a(z).([z = x]ok.stop+[z  =
x]no.stop) is determinate. (x :1 ..10). Hence, being Check(d)  ∗CheckOnceStop(d),
for every d, by Theorem 2 and Example 6 we have: R (Check; X)=
R (CheckOnceStop;X)=H( 1
10) ≈ 0.234.
6 Computing Bounds on Absolute Leakage
In this section, we analyze the problem of boundingabsolute leakage, from the position
of someone – e.g. a developer – who has access to the process’ code P, and for whom
it is inexpensive to draw independent samples of the data ˜ X. For simplicity, we shall
limit our discussion to the case where the side-information ˜ Y is empty, so that absolute
leakage reduces to H(Z),w h e r eZ = P( ˜ X). The problem is nontrivial, because even
for moderately complex P, the distribution of Z may be extremely difﬁcult to compute
or approximate. Methods commonly employed to estimate entropy in absence of an
explicitdescriptionofdistributioninvolvegenerationofsamplesequences,longenough
to let the underlying source’s redundancy become appreciable. These methods are not
applicable to our case, as operatingon samples of Z is extremely expensive.Generation
of even a single sample of Z – that is, an equivalence class, represented in some form
or another – generally takes exponential time and space in the size of P.
We suggest a strategythat may work in practice in a numberof cases, but we will not
dwell on complexity-theoretical issues. For any discrete random variable W, its index
of coincidence IC(W) is deﬁned as the probability that two independent experiments
yield the same result, that is, denoting byU the type ofW:
IC(W)
def = ∑
u∈U

Pr[X = u]
2.
Relationship of IC with Shannon entropy is seen by applying a well-known inequality
of convex functions (Jensen’s inequality, see e.g. [15]), which yields: −log IC(W) ≤
H(W) (the quantity on the LHS is known as Renyi’s entropy of order 2.) This inequality130 M. Boreale
has been vastly generalized by Harremoës and Topsøe [8], who provide whole fam-
ilies of lower- and upper-bounds of Shannon entropy in terms of IC. These bounds
are, in a certain technical sense, the "best possible" and provide fairly good esti-
mates of H(W) in many cases4. It remains to be seen how IC(W) can be efﬁciently
estimated in our case (W = Z). We show that this can be achieved via mgb’s. Let
φ(˜ x, ˜ x )
def = mgb

P(˜ x),P(˜ x )

,w h e r e˜ x  is a tuple of distinct variables disjoint from ˜ x.
By interpreting the boolean values true and false as 1 and 0, φ(˜ x, ˜ x ) can be interpreted
as a function ˜ U × ˜ U →{ 0,1}. We then have the following proposition, based on ele-
mentary reasoning on probabilities.
Proposition 4. Let ˜ X  be independent from ˜ X, but with the same type and distribution
as ˜ X.ThenIC(Z)=E[φ( ˜ X, ˜ X )].
The expectation E[φ( ˜ X, ˜ X )] can be estimated with any desired precision via the law of
large numbers:in practice, one draws several independentsamples of φ( ˜ X, ˜ X ) and then
takes the resulting arithmetical mean. The efﬁciency of this procedure depends on the
distribution of ˜ X and on the size of φ. Therefore, the problem of evaluating IC(Z) can
be reduced to the task of computing the formula φ, and possibly reducing its size by
means of logical simpliﬁcations. Dedicated algorithms exist for that (see [7]) which are
practical in many cases. Using this methodology, we have conducted some simple but
very encouraging experiments on timing-dependentleakage in modular exponentiation
algorithms (see e.g. [9]) that will be reported in the extended version of the paper.
7 Conclusions and Related Work
Results and proofs presented here carry over essentially unchanged to other calculi
equipped with behavioral equivalences, such as the spi-calculus – except for those that
depend on pi’s symbolic semantics, like effective computation of leakage. The exam-
ples considered in the paper are admittedly a bit artiﬁcial. More realistic case-studies,
possibly involving cryptography or probabilistic behaviour, are needed for assessing
the model’s scalability. In the leakage rate scenario, different notions of "cost" are also
worthwhile to be investigated.
Early works onquantitativeinformationﬂow are [13,17,6]. Volpanoand Smith have
later developed a quantiﬁed theory of non-interference for imperative programs, also
giving a notion of rate [16], albeit not based on information theory. These approaches,
like the one by Clark et al. [12], presuppose that computations produce some form or
another of "result" , possibly with an associated probability distribution, in the sense
already discussed in the introduction. A notable exception is represented by the recent
work of Lowe [11]. There, quantitative non-interferencefor timed CSP is deﬁned as the
number of different"low" behavioursthat a "high" user can induce on the process. This
deﬁnition is shown to be in agreement with a qualitative notion of lack of information
ﬂow due to Focardi and Gorrieri [5]. A notion of rate is also introduced by taking time
explicitly into account. These notions are not easily comparable to ours, due to the
different goals and settings (secrecy vs. non-interference,untimed vs. timed.)
4 As an example, in the case of binary distributions (p,1− p), an upper bound U can be given
s.t. the ratio H/U lies between 1 and 0.9 for all distributions with p ∈ [0.03,0.97].Quantifying Information Leakage in Process Calculi 131
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